Issue Briefs

Voices of the Nation: Indonesia Prepares for the 2024 Election

On February 14, 2024, the citizens of Indonesia will vote to elect the President, Vice President, and People’s Consultative Body (MPR), consisting of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Senate (DPD), and members of local (provincial level as well as region-level or city-level) legislative bodies. The in-office president, Joko Widodo, is ineligible to run for office due to the term limit imposed by the Indonesian Constitution (Mishra). Since the 1998 democratic transition, elections in Indonesia have become a celebration of their civic rights. The 1965 anti-communist purge brought President Suharto to power, but the devastating impact of the 1998 Asian financial crisis forced him to resign. The diverse array of candidates and their contrasting policy proposals, coupled with the increasing influence of social media on the younger generation of voters, adds complexity to the political scenario. As Indonesia stands on the cusp of a new era, the nation faces the challenge of shaping its future direction, grappling with issues ranging from economic policies to social equality, and contending with the potential implications of political dynasties.

In 1999, Indonesia had its first election after the resignation of President Suharto. However, the leading parties in the election were the same parties that were a part of Suharto’s parliament. The leading party in the election was Megawati’s Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP). Shuharto’s party Golkar of regime loyalists from the military and business sectors stood second. And the United Development Party of Muslim elites stood third. Regime insiders, maintaining almost two-thirds of parliamentary seats, revised political opposition regulations to maintain dominance. Between 2001 and 2002, constitutional amendments covered measures for improving representation and situations favouring incumbent parties, despite public pressure for accelerated competitiveness (Jaffrey). This will be the fifth consecutive election in Indonesia where presidential elections are direct; the 1999 presidential election was indirect.

Election in 2024

The Election Commission of Indonesia announced three pairs of candidates for president and vice president who will contest the election in February 2024. The candidature of three presidential candidates instead of the typical two would be good for Indonesia’s political stability as it could prevent deepening polarisation among the main parties’ supporters (Mujiono et. al.). This is the second time that presidential and legislative elections will be held simultaneously in Indonesia. In the 2019 election, 80% of the eligible voters participated, indicating that democracy is treasured in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election is predicted to be a test for democracy because the candidates have all run for office earlier than or are supported by established players. This leaves Indonesians with fewer new candidates and new ideas to elect from. Elections in Indonesia are often based on the personality of the leader, with all the candidates promoting similar agendas such as growth, jobs, and development. To be the winner, a candidate needs a simple majority of votes, or more than 50% of the votes. If the candidates manage both conditions, a run-off election will be held in June between the two candidates with the highest numbers of votes (Kapoor and Petty).

An open proportional election system has been implemented since the 2009 general elections, where voters directly vote for candidates for legislative members listed on their ballot paper. Earlier, from 1971 to 1997, the closed proportional system was in force, where the voters voted for the political parties and then the parties internally picked the members for the legislative. This has given the voters more power over the political parties to decide who will get the legislative seat (Krismantari and Ramadhani).

The Candidates and Promises

Former special forces commander Prabowo Subianto is running for the presidency of Indonesia, having lost to President Widodo in 2014 and 2019. Subianto, a former son-in-law of late President Suharto, has a large following despite allegations of human rights violations and abuses in East Timor. After losing the 2019 election, Widodo appointed him as Defence Minister, which helped heal divisions. Subianto chairs the Great Indonesia Movement party, which endorsed him as its presidential candidate. His running mate is Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who has served as Surakarta mayor since 2020 and is the eldest son of Jokowi.

Indonesia’s ruling Democratic Party of Struggle is focusing on Ganjar Pranowo, a former governor of Central Java, who has gained significant support among ordinary Indonesians as a leader outside the political and military elite. Pranowo, who initially appeared to be backed by Widodo, hopes his popularity on social media and with young voters will bring him victory. However, his chances have dwindled since he backed a call to stop Israel from participating in the under-20 football World Cup, in which Indonesia was dropped as host. Pranowo’s running mate, Mahfud MD, is a former Constitutional Court judge who has taken a stand against corruption and has been outspoken over high-profile police corruption cases and attempts to change the constitution to extend presidential terms (Mokhtar).

Anies Baswedan was the former governor of Jakarta from 2017 to 2022. Baswedan was praised for his COVID-19 response but criticised for handling recurrent flooding in the congested capital. He is not a member of a political party but is backed by three parties: a secular party in the ruling coalition and the conservative Islamic Prosperous Justice Party. His rise in 2017 was controversial, as he accepted the endorsement of hardline Islamist groups that agitated against his opponent and then-Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Baswedan, who espouses moderate Islam, has rejected claims that he is doing little to mend religious and communal rifts. His running mate is Muhaimin Iskandar, head of the National Awakening Party and former deputy speaker of the People’s Representative Council. Iskandar has strong networks within the Nahdlatul Ulama and is expected to draw votes from his base in East Java (Indonesia prepares for the 2024 election: Who are the candidates?).

Presidential candidates in Indonesia are actively engaging with Tebuireng Islamic boarding school in East Java, a significant religious and political hub, to secure votes ahead of the upcoming elections. The school houses the tombs of notable figures, including Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), and his grandfather, Hasyim Asy’ari, the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Candidates Anies Baswedan, Prabowo Subianto, and Ganjar Pranowo have visited Tebuireng, aiming to strengthen relationships and gain support from influential alumni. East Java, with its 31.4 million eligible voters, plays a crucial role in elections, having the second-largest voter pool after West Java. The province is a battleground for candidates, and winning support from Islamic groups, such as NU, is seen as pivotal. The outcome in East Java may significantly impact the candidates’ overall success in the threecornered presidential race. As Indonesia faces its first such presidential contest since 2009, securing votes in key provinces, including East Java, becomes essential for a candidate’s path to victory (Siregar).

In terms of economic progress, Anies and Muhaimin set a target of 5.5% to 6.5% growth until 2029. They aim to achieve it through wealth distribution and social justice. Team Prabowo and Gibran promise 6 to 7% growth with the strategy “Jokowinomious,” which is a closed economy system. The “we have all strategy” of Ganjar and Mahfud has set a target of a 7% growth rate. All of them promise to improve the standard of living and reduce poverty. Simultaneously, developing an industrial base for the country to reduce dependence on imports and develop physical infrastructure. They all agree to build a base for the economy that can facilitate investment and trade. However, when it comes to the role of the government, all these teams suggest different ways. Anies and Muhaimin promote a higher role for the private sector and a limited government role. In contrast to that, Prabowo and Gibran favour a more state-controlled economy. Taking a middle ground, Ganjar and Mahfud want the government to act as a regulator and facilitator, guiding development, but not an active player (Nugroho).

The candidates are contrasting their views on trade, liberalisation, social equity, environmental sustainability, and social protection. Prabowo and Gibran’s focus on protectionism contrasts with Anies and Muhaimin’s emphasis on liberalisation and market-based solutions. Ganjar and Mahfud aim to balance domestic industry protection with foreign direct investment-based innovation. Team Anies and Ganjar focus on tackling social inequality and environmental concerns, while Prabowo focuses on growth and national self-sufficiency (Nugroho).

Anies’ policy aims to encourage renewable energy investment and phase out coal power plants, reflecting international energy transition and sustainability sentiments. He may focus on Western collaborations, as seen during his Jakarta governorship. Both Ganjar and Prabowo are expected to maintain the Jokowi administration’s market-oriented approach to the energy transition. Ganjar-Mahfud aligns with industry figures advocating for developed nations to provide capital and share technology to help emerging countries quit coal. Prabowo’s connections to coal businesses could influence his coordination of energy transition policies (Octavia).

Jokowi has emphasised social protection, particularly social assistance, and all candidates understand the importance of moving up the value chain in Indonesia. On the planned relocation of the new capital city, Prabowo and Ganjar support the Indonesian Key Infrastructure Project (IKN), despite criticism from academia and civil society. They pledge to uphold sustainability and environmental responsibility in the IKN’s execution. Anies and Muhaiminis are critical of the IKN, questioning its feasibility and high cost and arguing that the government should focus on addressing poverty and inequality (Nugroho).

Political Dynasty in Indonesia in 2024

After Suharto’s ouster, rules were established, including a 20% parliamentary seat requirement for presidential candidates, favouring entrenched elites. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, played a crucial role in the rise of President Joko Widodo. Megawati supported Jokowi’s 2014 presidential bid, despite his non-elite background. Over time, Jokowi distanced himself from party norms, building his support base. However, Jokowi’s tenure faced controversies, including human rights concerns reported by Human Rights Watch in 2020. Critics argue that democratic institutions were weakened, and the military’s role in civilian affairs grew. Despite constitutional limitations preventing Jokowi’s reelection, he is accused of establishing a political “dynasty” (Meakem).

As the first individual from outside of Indonesia’s conventional elite to hold political office, liberals there applauded Jokowi’s win in 2014. Now that his tenure is up, he appears to have created a dynasty. President Joko Widodo’s and his potential efforts to establish a political dynasty through his sons, particularly focusing on Gibran Rakabuming and his younger brother Kaesang Pangarep, have gained attention. Jokowi, who rose to power with a common-man image, is currently polling at 71% popularity, a significant figure for a world leader. Jokowi’s attempt to groom his sons for political positions raises concerns. Gibran Rakabuming is eyeing the position of vice president of Indonesia.

Meanwhile, Kaesang Pangarep is being groomed for future political roles. Additionally, Jokowi’s son-in-law, Muhammad Bobby Nasution, serves as the mayor of Medan, the fourthlargest city in Indonesia. The risk Jokowi takes is potentially compromising his common-man image by attempting to establish a political dynasty through his family members (McBeth).

The Constitutional Court in Indonesia ruled that candidates under the required age of 40 could seek the presidency or vice presidency in the 2024 elections, given they have previously held elected regional offices. Indonesian President Jokowi has backed Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto as his successor, with Gibran Rakabuming Raka as his running mate. Judge M. Guntur Hamzah ruled that age restrictions would be an “injustice” against younger Indonesians with government experience (Widianto and Teresia).

Gibran and Jokowi faced challenges due to the election law requiring a minimum age of 40 for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Chief Justice Anwar Usman intervened to reverse the court’s previous decisions, allowing younger candidates to stand if they had previously held office as head of a sub-national government. Gibran, 36, served as mayor, a job his father once held. However, three judges dissented, raising questions about Anwar’s behaviour and conflict of interest. Public outrage led the court’s ethics tribunal to remove him last month. Anwar remains one of the nine judges on the court, and Gibran’s nomination as a vice presidential candidate cannot be reversed. The national legislature is debating amendments to the Constitutional Court statute, which could enable the removal of dissenting judges, ironically through the imposition of a minimum age requirement on Constitutional Court judges (Smith).

Despite past political differences, Jokowi aligns with Prabowo, suggesting a strategic move to build a political dynasty. Their campaign has co-opted government agencies, reinventing Prabowo’s image. This move has risked alienating Jokowi from PDI-P’s influential leader, Megawati Soekarnoputeri (Lindsey and Butt).

Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s support for presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, similar to USA presidential endorsements, has raised concerns about impartiality and electoral integrity. The president’s involvement in events and meals with Prabowo raises questions about the presidency’s neutrality. Critics argue that this endorsement by Widodo is to declare his endorsement and distinguish personal campaigning from presidential duties. Observers call for transparency and legal obligations for neutrality, and the situation raises broader questions about future presidents’ prerogatives in picking successors (Haizan and Ericssen).

Indonesian politics is witnessing a surge in political dynasties, with relatives of political elites, governors, mayors, and ministers running for seats even in the House of Representatives. Notable political heirs include Pinka Hapsari, daughter of House Speaker Puan Maharani and granddaughter of PDI-P chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri, and Futri Zulya Savitri, daughter of PAN chairman Zulkifli Hasan. The trend extends to family members of regional leaders, party leaders, and influential figures. This rise in political and familial connections raises concerns about sidelining the interests of the public and consolidating power within the elite. The practice of nominating candidates based on familial ties rather than merit is seen as a shortcut by parties facing difficulties in finding candidates with sufficient social and financial capital (Lai).

Indonesian political dynasties are not new, with every president having at least one immediate family member who has entered politics. This discourages the development of other politicians without strong connections, as someone with connections could bypass someone who has worked hard within the party ranks. Top leaders choose their people due to trust issues and the need to execute programmes or achieve certain goals. While the Indonesian constitution does not prohibit family members of top leaders from running for office, it is not considered fair to use their popularity to win votes (Siregar).

Youth Aspirations in the Election Arena

An interesting fact about the 2024 Indonesian election is that the younger generation, aged 22–30, will be the majority of the total voters, with almost half being first-time voters. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) revealed that younger voter participation was up to 91.3% in 2019 from 85.9% in the 2014 elections. Therefore, candidates have implemented social media strategies to attract them (Krismantari and Ramadhani).

Dr. Mada Sukmajati, a political expert from the UGM Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, emphasised young voters’ significance in the electoral climate. Comparatively speaking to earlier generations, younger voters are more unpredictable and prone to changes in emotions. They have a distinct perception of politicians’ profiles and prefer simpler political information. According to a study conducted in August 2022 by the CSIS, approximately 51% are open to changing their preferences for the presidential election, while a staggering 58.1% might still switch allegiances for the legislative elections. Young voters rank social welfare, eliminating corruption, democracy, civil rights, health, environmental issues, and jobs as the most significant topics (Grehenson).

These young voters may have different familial inclinations. Younger voters are concerned about the impact of the political dynasties in the country. They favour equitable representation of women and individuals who have truly contributed to the nation’s growth. In contrast to the past elections, when he was seen as a nationalist, Prabowo’s supporters used social media to depict him as an animal lover to win over young people. Younger voters, however, are more interested in the presidential candidates’ ideas and ambitions than in their social media personas. They want each candidate to present a comprehensive plan that addresses concerns that millennials and Generation Z confront, such as mental health, health insurance, and assistance for tech businesses (Yuniar).

In the face of the digital age, experts caution that the overpowering noise on social media may complicate decision-making for younger Indonesian voters. Experts highlight the underrepresentation of younger people in politics, attributing it to factors such as the dominance of older leaders and a political system controlled by mounted figures.
The prevalence of gerontocracy in Indonesia’s political panorama, where older leaders dominate events, is recognised as a limitation to active youth participation. The challenges faced by youth, like economic obstacles, further restrict youth’s involvement in politics. Nevertheless, a few young citizens articulate their expectations for the future president,
stressing the significance of national unity, addressing the wishes of marginalised regions like Papua, and unlocking Indonesia’s capabilities. The overarching problem for young voters is whether candidates can effectively translate their promises into concrete movements that advantage the younger generation (Afriatni and Idrus).

Implications for foreign policy

As Jokowi’s tenure as President of Indonesia began in 2014, he emphasised an economy-first foreign policy. He pursued this policy to make Indonesia a leading world economy and among the top five world economies by 2045. Jokowi reinforced the country’s image as a commodity giant through onshoring production and building infrastructure, the largest of which was the development of the new capital city of Nusantara. The decision to move the capital from Jakarta to Nusantara has been criticised and is a contested issue in campaigns for the 2024 elections.

Out of the three candidates, Prabowo Subianto’s view on foreign policy is best known. Given his defence background, he is expected to devote his foreign policy to improving Indonesian military capabilities and be assertive against external challenges. Prabowo is expected to reclaim Indonesia’s central role in ASEAN and upgrade relations with the USA. Anies’ base is not fond of the USA, and Ganjar is inexperienced in foreign affairs. Prabowo also plans to upgrade security links with Japan, which has become assertive in building defence ties with Southeast Asian states like the Philippines and Vietnam. He maintains Indonesia’s desire for close relationships with all major and middle powers and may not go as far as Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., tilting away from China (Kurlantzick).

While the actual turnout of foreign policy will be clear after the elections, some scenarios can be anticipated. Firstly, the next president might not depart much from Jokowi’s foreign policy. Indonesia will maintain a free and active foreign policy. Here, the country will speak more actively about international and regional developments and move beyond narrow domestic interests. Secondly, the president might maintain the status quo and continue the domestic-centred and economy-driven foreign policy of Jokowi. In the last scenario, there can be a major shift in foreign policy with a globalist vision, as followed by Mr. Yudhoyono, Jokowi’s predecessor. If Indonesia here pursues a value-based policy, then the country will pursue closer ties with Western countries and counter China. Another version of a major shift
from the current foreign policy might manifest as an authoritarian foreign policy merged with populist impulses and a hostile approach towards those who differ from Indonesia’s values and goals (Parameshwaran).

Indonesia’s foreign policy, historically linked to presidential priorities, has seen shifts from a foreign affairs focus under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Jokowi’s emphasis on domestic concerns. Despite this inconsistency, recent leadership roles in the G20 and ASEAN highlight Indonesia’s intent to align international influence with economic interests, such as developing an ASEAN electric vehicle supply chain. Presidential candidates Ganjar and Prabowo both aim for stronger economic ties with China, but potential divergence lies in defence and diplomacy. Ganjar, lacking international experience, may rely on existing diplomatic channels, while Prabowo’s military background suggests a focus on sovereignty, particularly in the face of China’s presence in maritime territories. Anies Baswedan advocates for a
values-driven foreign policy, criticising transactional approaches and actively engaging with the Western world. The three candidates are expected to maintain a non-diplomatic stance towards Israel. Ganjar’s recent opposition to Israel’s sports participation resulted in Indonesia losing hosting rights, reflecting the country’s consistent position in the Middle East conflict (Octavia)

India and Indonesia, two of the world’s most populous and largest democracies, have a deep-rooted cultural heritage combining Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism. They have supported each other globally, including by founding the Non-Aligned Movement and supporting each other’s agendas at global events like the G20. Both countries share a common goal of establishing mutually beneficial relationships and are well-positioned to maintain cooperation and contribute to the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. Elections in India and Indonesia will determine the impact of changes in government on their approach to the Indo-Pacific Region, as the region is crucial for global geopolitics and has significant maritime trade routes (Rajput and Ghosh).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 2024 elections in Indonesia carry significant weight, serving as a litmus test for the nation’s democratic resilience and the evolving aspirations of its people. The three pairs of candidates present diverse visions for the country, from economic strategies to the role of government in shaping Indonesia’s future. As the younger generation emerges as a dominant force in the electorate, their expectations and concerns further shape the election narrative. The spectre of political dynasties and the controversies surrounding candidate eligibility add complexity to the electoral landscape. Beyond the domestic arena, the implications of the election extend to Indonesia’s foreign policy, potentially influencing its regional and global standing. Ultimately, the outcomes of the 2024 elections will reverberate through the socio-political fabric of Indonesia, shaping its trajectory for years to come.

REFERENCES

Shivangi Dikshit