Under the incumbent President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, Indonesia’s stance on the South China Sea (SCS) disputes has undergone a gradual transformation wherein Indonesia’s outward-looking role as a peaceful mediator to resolve the disputes over the contested sea territory has shifted to a more inward-looking or unilateral approach, primarily focused on securing and protecting its own territorial sovereignty, in concern to the Natuna Islands. The Jokowi administration, which has been in power since 2014, has cautiously administered the shift in its policies towards the disputed SCS without risking diplomatic tensions with China, which claims the entirety of the SCS as its own territory, including the Natuna Islands, which falls under the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia- a right and entitlement secured through the binding legislature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indonesia’s long-standing neutral stance in the long history of the dispute over the SCS has lost elements of its neutrality over the last decade as China’s increasing incursions around the Natuna Islands, which considers the Islands to be its ‘traditional fishing grounds’ and the added unwillingness of the Jokowi Administration to engage in regional diplomacy on these matters has resulted in a gradual policy shift. Indonesia’s shift to an inward-looking policy towards the SCS signals the beginning of a greater power rivalry in the Southeast Asian region as it leaves the other countries in the region more vulnerable and exposed to Chinese diplomatic pressure than they were under the Yudhoyono Administration, led by Jokowi’s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Keywords: South China Sea, Disputes, China, Indonesia, Natuna Islands.

Introduction

As the world’s largest archipelagic nation, Indonesia’s economy has long relied on its maritime domain. Its waters serve as a vital source of trade and livelihood for both the country and its people. The Djuanda Declaration of 1957 formalised the importance of the maritime domain for Indonesia, establishing that the sea is an integral part of Indonesian territory. The Indonesian word for homeland, “tanah air”, literally translates to ‘land and water’ (Sambhi, 2015, p. 39). Indonesia’s strategic location in the middle of Asia and Australia, and at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, makes it well-positioned to become the world’s axis maritime country. As a vital crossroad for the world logistics system, Indonesia has the capacity and capability to serve as a critical transportation hub for sea-based trade and logistics. Given that sea transportation is the backbone of global trade, Indonesia’s geographical advantage places it in a unique position to play a crucial role in the world’s maritime industry. Thus, it becomes obvious why security and stability in its maritime domain are considered objectives of absolute paramount importance to policymakers in Indonesia. However, due to Indonesia’s vastness, its maritime domains are vulnerable to various challenges, including illegal fishing and disputed maritime boundaries (Sambhi, 2015, p. 39).

Indonesia faces a particularly significant challenge in safeguarding its vast archipelago and maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially in light of disputes over islands and competing claims, such as those from neighbouring Malaysia. As a result, protecting Indonesia’s archipelagic sovereignty is a ‘critical strategic interest’ (Sambhi, 2015, p. 45). However, China’s increasingly assertive behaviour concerning its territorial claims in the SCS is the most significant development in this area. This behaviour substantially threatens Indonesia’s interests and security in the region. Although China’s claims and activities in the SCS have affected all the countries surrounding the sea, the dispute between China and Indonesia is often given less attention compared to more contentious disputes with countries closer to the Chinese mainland, such as Vietnam and the Philippines (Connelly, 2016). Indonesia holds a critical position in this maritime dispute, given that the country is the largest and the most populous amongst the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has traditionally served as an influential leader for the organisation in matters of conflicted interests, including the SCS disputes.

The SCS remains an area of concern for Indonesian leaders and policymakers, particularly given recent confrontations such as the one seen in 2016 between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal. Additionally, China’s rapid construction of artificial islands in disputed waters over the last decades has only increased tensions. China claims these islands are for ‘military and civilian purposes’, as stated on April 9, 2014, by the then-Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying, in response to the release of satellite images by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the very same year (Glaser, 2015). It is imperative to note that Indonesia maintains a distinctive position among Southeast Asian states in not claiming any territory in the SCS under China’s ‘nine-dash line’ map submitted to the United Nations in 2009. Nevertheless, under the incumbent President, Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, Indonesia is committed to resolving these disputes peacefully per international law and ensuring the freedom of navigation in the adjacent seas. Jokowi reiterated this commitment in his address to the 9th East Asia Summit held in Myanmar from November 12-14, 2014. Subsequently, Indonesia’s foreign ministry has offered to act as an “honest broker” in negotiations for a Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN to facilitate this commitment.

Stance during the Suharto era

During President Suharto’s authoritarian rule in Indonesia from 1968 until 1998, the country’s foreign policy often positioned itself favourably, along the lines of neutrality. Even before the advent of the “New Order Indonesia” and Suharto’s leadership, the SCS dispute did not hold much significance in Indonesia’s political landscape, as the country was largely disinterested in matters of international issues. During Suharto’s tenure, the focus was on rebuilding the economy, which had been in disarray due to rampant inflation, a consequence of the inability of the previous administration under the leadership of Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno. Although Indonesia does not claim any territory in the SCS, the country has been closely monitoring the ongoing dispute due to its proximity to its territorial waters. Indonesia’s first recorded concern over the issue dates back to 1980, when their diplomatic relations with China were still strained. It is worth noting that Indonesia did not normalise their diplomatic relations with China until a decade later, in 1990 – a stance maintained since Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno. According to Aplianta (2015, p.5), in 1980, Indonesia’s Military Commander at the time, M. Yusuf commented on the possibility of war in the SCS. As a response, Indonesia projected its military power by deploying 35 battalions for military exercises in the disputed waters surrounding the Natuna Islands. Aplianta (2015, p. 5) concluded that Indonesia’s response to the dispute was driven by the Suharto Administration’s concern for domestic security, particularly border and territorial issues that could potentially lead to disintegration.

In 1991, China’s normalisation with Indonesia in 1990 led to its inclusion as an official dialogue partner for the ASEAN when the then-Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and State Councillor, Qian Qichen, attended the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July of 1991. This allowed for improved communication between China and ASEAN member countries, which Cold War tensions had previously hindered. Aplianta (2015, p.6) recognised that although China’s participation in the ASEAN forum was a positive development, it did not fully resolve the underlying disputes that continued to cause issues.

Tensions over the Natuna Islands

The territorial conflicts in the SCS persist, and China’s disagreements with Indonesia are no exception. The origins of this dispute can be traced back to an infamous map drawn by Chinese Nationalist diplomats in 1947. The map displays a broken line that encloses a substantial portion of the SCS, with the specific geography of the line differing on each Chinese map. However, on all versions of the map, one of the dashes intersects with the north boundary of Indonesia’s declared Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to the north of the Natunas, approximately 1400 kilometres from the Chinese mainland. This disputed area is significant, as it is a valuable fishery with considerable natural gas reserves, measuring up to 46 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas (Azwar, 2015). Interestingly, Beijing has not clarified the purpose of the broken line. At times, broad Chinese declarations propose that they describe a claim to a territorial sea or an EEZ. At the same time, in other cases, the line serves as a mere guideline to illustrate China’s claims to fishing rights or islands and rocks within the region without separate maritime entitlements. It is essential to note that, unlike other countries affected by China’s dashed line, China and Indonesia do not dispute sovereignty over any land features. Nonetheless, China’s maritime claims within the broken line are a significant concern for Indonesia.

Since 1993, Indonesia has been urging China to clarify the nature of its dashed line claim, which included a part of Indonesia’s EEZ. Indonesia expressed concern about the line’s lack of international legal basis and the potential violation of UNCLOS in a note verbale (No 480/POL-703/VII/10) to the UN Secretary-General in July 2010. However, Indonesia has mostly ignored the line, as it believes that any claim to maritime entitlements, such as an EEZ or fishing rights, can only be substantiated under international law with reference to land features. As there are no disputes between China and Indonesia regarding the sovereignty of land features, Indonesia thinks ignoring the line’s existence is the most prudent course of action. This approach, which began in the 1990s with the then-Foreign Minister Ali Atalas, allows Indonesia to treat any disagreements arising from Chinese actions in the overlapping areas as unrelated to the disputes of other countries in the region, enabling Indonesia to assert its position as a non-claimant in the broader SCS disputes and play the role of an “honest broker” in negotiations. Indonesia has also hosted informal workshops on the issue from 1990 to 2014, but the effectiveness of these workshops remains to be seen after more than 25 years (Connelly, 2016). Although Indonesia’s reluctance to challenge the dashed line’s legitimacy openly weakens international efforts to counter expansive Chinese claims, it helps Indonesia avoid difficult conversations with China.

Clashes over the Natunas

Indonesia’s policy of playing a safer mediator role in South China Sea disputes has faced various challenges in recent years. Kipgen (2021, p. 118) recognised this is primarily due to China’s increasing assertiveness in the area and its advanced naval and marine units. In 2010, an Indonesian patrol boat was threatened at gunpoint by a Chinese marine vessel after the former arrested Chinese trawlers for illegal fishing in the Natuna waters. As per Supriyanto (2012), Indonesia has found it difficult to understand the basis of China’s historical claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a response, Indonesia sent a diplomatic note to the United Nations, stating that China’s claim has no legal basis. While Indonesia is not opposed to discussing the SCS in regional forums attended by other naval powers, including the United States, it has an inherent problem with China.

Another notable incident occurred on 17 June 2016, when the KRI Imam Bonjol, a small Indonesian Navy corvette, engaged with a fleet of at least seven Chinese fishing boats and two larger Chinese Coast Guard vessels in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near the remote Natuna Islands (“Indonesia Detains Chinese Fishing Boat and Crew for Illegal Fishing,” 2016). While neighbours have acknowledged the waters north of the Natunas as part of Indonesia’s EEZ, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has since the 1990s implied and openly declared in 2016 that they are “traditional Chinese fishing grounds,” as per the then-Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hua Chunying’s remarks on 19th June 2016, in response to the events of 17th June. After firing warning shots, the Imam Bonjol chased and seized one of the fishing boats and arrested its crew for illegal fishing before returning to its run-down base at Ranai on the island of Natuna Besar. The incident was one of a series of encounters in the region between Indonesian authorities and Chinese vessels. Although the Chinese Coast Guard did not attempt to prevent the arrest, as it had during a similar incident in March 2016, the Chinese Foreign Ministry protested the next day, as per Chan and Soeriaatmadja’s article for The Strait Times published on 20th June 2016 (as cited in Connelly, 2016). On June 23, 2016, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, made a historic visit to Natuna Besar, becoming the first Indonesian head of state to do so. The visit was primarily focused on discussing the development of the area’s rich fisheries and natural gas reserves, along with defence matters. The President’s visit was also a clear message to China that Indonesia was prepared to protect its sovereign rights in its EEZ, even if it meant using force. This move was widely praised by analysts both inside and outside Indonesia, who interpreted it as a sign of Indonesia’s firm stance regarding China’s actions in the South China Sea (Connelly, 2016). China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, acknowledged overlapping claims over maritime interests in certain waters of the region following Indonesia’s response. However, it is interesting to note that China does not dispute Indonesia’s sovereignty claim over the Natunas. Yet, it maintains that it has the right to conduct fishing in these waters. This irony was also highlighted in Otto’s 2016 article (as cited in Kipgen, 2021, p. 121).

Conclusion

The author conducted an in-depth study of the complications and dynamics of Indonesia’s position, policy, and approach concerning the SCS disputes. Given the turbulent and latent nature of the disputes in regard to maritime and territorial sovereignty, along with its proximity to Indonesia’s own sovereign waters and EEZ, Indonesia finds itself in a critical state regardless of its claim of positioning itself to be a non-claimant in the disputes. It is imperative to note that Indonesia has much to lose if the disputes spiral out of control. However, the possibilities of a full-fledged military or naval confrontation among the active claimants are minimal, at least for the foreseeable future. Not only is its economic reliance on the waters, which can be sustained only through a stable and secure maritime climate, at stake, but the additional risk of offending China while securing its sovereignty, especially over the disputed waters of the Natunas, can have a devastating ripple effect on its infrastructural developments, which relies heavily on Chinese investments in its economy. Apart from its internal sovereign and economic risks, Indonesia bears the additional responsibility of ensuring that the disputes are resolved with as little complications for itself and the greater Southeast Asian region per internationally recognised maritime entitlements and legislations, especially the 1982 UNCLOS mandate, given its status as one of the geopolitical leaders in the region. Indonesia’s neutral posture during the Suharto regime and the subsequent policy of the 1990s, where it outright refused to accept any territorial disputes with China in the SCS in a bid to deny any legitimacy to China’s claim over its EEZ helped Indonesia position itself as an honest broker in the SCS disputes for a large part of the 2000s and the 2010s. However, the gradual increase in China’s aggression in the SCS, as proven through multiple Chinese incursions in the 2010s, has vehemently displayed the inability of Indonesia’s ‘neutral and no-claimant’ posture to counter Chinese tactics effectively. Thus, it is not very challenging to understand why Indonesia, in the 2010s, under its incumbent administration led by Joko Widodo, has pushed for a more assertive stance in the disputes.

The Way Forward

The author agrees with the notion Kipgen (2021) put forward, arguing that Indonesia is indeed a ‘Reluctant Participant’ in the SCS disputes. Indonesia’s posture under its previous administrations aimed to keep China at bay, including efforts to facilitate an effective Code of Conduct (CoC) between the ASEAN states and the aggressor China since 1996, during a meeting of foreign ministers from ASEAN in Jakarta, Indonesia, first endorsed the idea of concluding a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea, which will lay the foundation for long-term stability in the area and foster understanding among claimant countries. It is important to note that the development of the CoC in the SCS has faced significant challenges due to China’s reservations about the scope of the legislation and the individual interests of each claimant state. These challenges have limited the ability of ASEAN to work together cohesively towards their shared goal of securing the SCS. Additionally, the nonbinding nature of the CoC means that it may not be effective in preventing China from continuing to claim and operate in the waters of the SCS, even if the CoC is eventually finalised after negotiation. Additionally, Vietnam’s actions in the region have raised concerns as they seem to follow China’s playbook. This behaviour could further weaken ASEAN’s negotiations with China over an SCS CoC that aims to establish rules and norms in the maritime domain. If ASEAN member states continue to have disagreements at sea, they risk losing leverage in their negotiations with China. Keeping all this in mind, it can be understood why the Jokowi Administration has lost interest in international negotiations, which led to no security for Indonesia in the long run. The Indonesian government, led by Jokowi, will face crucial choices regarding the rules of engagement it should adopt to protect its maritime sovereignty. Given the increasing likelihood of maritime conflicts in the region, Indonesia must exercise strong diplomatic leadership and effective inter-agency coordination. Failure to do so would exacerbate tensions within ASEAN and weaken its ability to moderate major power tensions in the broader region.

REFERENCES

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